Do Children still need to Escape Childhood? A Reassessment of John Holt and his Vision for Children's Rights by Byrne, Bronagh
Do Children still need to Escape Childhood? A Reassessment of John
Holt and his Vision for Children's Rights
Byrne, B. (2016). Do Children still need to Escape Childhood? A Reassessment of John Holt and his Vision for
Children's Rights. DOI: 10.1163/15718182-02401002
Published in:
International Journal of Children's Rights
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Queen's University Belfast - Research Portal:
Link to publication record in Queen's University Belfast Research Portal
Publisher rights
Copyright © 2016 Koninklijke Brill NV.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Queen's University Belfast Research Portal is retained by the author(s) and / or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated
with these rights.
Take down policy
The Research Portal is Queen's institutional repository that provides access to Queen's research output. Every effort has been made to
ensure that content in the Research Portal does not infringe any person's rights, or applicable UK laws. If you discover content in the
Research Portal that you believe breaches copyright or violates any law, please contact openaccess@qub.ac.uk.
Download date:09. Sep. 2018
1 
 
Do Children still need to Escape Childhood? A Reassessment of John Holt and 
his Vision for Children’s Rights 
 
Dr Bronagh Byrne 
School of Sociology, Social Policy and Social Work 
Queen’s University Belfast 
Northern Ireland 
BT7 1NN 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The work of children’s liberationists have been long been critiqued for pushing the 
parameters of rights discourse too far; specifically, by suggesting that there are no 
significant differences between children and adults, including their ability for self-
determination. John Holt’s 1974 text Escape from Childhood is one such work which 
was deemed highly controversial for its time. This article uses Holt’s Escape from 
Childhood as an overarching framework against which to examine the current state of 
play on children’s rights as explicated through the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child. It suggests that whilst Holt has often been critiqued for being too radical, in the 
context of current children’s rights discourse Holt’s visioning is not as radical as it might 
first appear.  
 
 
Keywords: children’s rights, childhood, libertarianism, John Holt, implementation, 
autonomy rights, self-deterimination.  
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Do Children still need to Escape Childhood? A Reassessment of John Holt and 
his Vision for Children’s Rights 
 
Introduction  
 
The theoretical underpinnings of childhood and children’s rights have evolved 
significantly since the twentieth century. Children are now, by and large, recognised 
most fundamentally as beings rather than mere becomings (Qvortrup 1994); as human 
subjects in their own right, freed from the long held shackles of objectivity, silence and 
invisibility. The value accorded to children and young people by academia, 
researchers, and policymakers, has spawned a vast range of seminal texts and 
academic journals; degree programmes in areas such as childhood studies, the 
sociology of childhood, and children’s rights; and children’s strategies, action plans 
and commissioners or ombudspersons targeted specifically at this group. At the heart 
of these endeavours is the premise that children and young people are a distinct 
population group, who, because of their age, are more vulnerable than adults, may 
have differential experiences, and therefore warrant specific attention and/or 
protections. In short, that there are legitimate and ‘morally relevant differences’ 
between children and adults (Purdy 1994, p.223). This stance has been reaffirmed by 
the recent 25th anniversary of the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (‘the CRC’); an undoubtedly celebratory cause for children’s rights. 
In codifying and legitimising a broad spectrum of children’s rights in international law, 
the CRC sets the minimum standards or benchmarks which states should meet across 
most aspects of children’s lives, on the basis that childhood necessitates ‘special care 
and assistance’ (UNCRC, 1989 preamble). These codified economic, social, cultural, 
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civil and political rights are now accepted – in principle at least, by States parties; the 
entirety of the globe with the exception of the United States, who have ratified the 
Convention. 
 
It might thus seem odd that, given the aforementioned discursive progress that has 
been made, this article revisits the twentieth century to take the musings of John Holt, 
a key proponent of children’s libertarianism, as its focus. Holt’s work, ‘Escape from 
Childhood’, published in 1974, is about the ‘needs and rights of children’. This 
reference to rights at the outset is of import. Similarly to other children’s liberationists 
such as Farson in ‘Birthrights’ (1978), and Firestone in the ‘The Dialectic of Sex’ 
(1970), Holt asserts that children should be accorded the same rights as adults; most 
notably in the realm of self-determination, in order to overcome the oppression that is 
the institution of childhood. These ideas, and those of other child liberationists have 
been hotly challenged for taking rights discourse to the somewhat ‘extreme’ in 
suggesting that there are no significant differences between children and adults, 
including their ability for self-determination (Purdy, 1994; Archard 1993, 2004; 
Freeman 1983, 1997, 2007; Veerman, 1992). While there appears to have been some 
consensus as to the pitfalls of child libertarianism, challenges in facilitating positive 
outcomes for all children and young people and in effectively realising children’s rights 
are evident in today’s society. High and consistent levels of poverty, the impact of 
austerity, and realities of marginalisation have been well documented (see for 
example, UNICEF 2012; Council of Europe, 2014; Save the Children 2014) and a 
practical consensus on how best to address these issues is ever problematic. It is 
precisely because of these challenges that the time is ripe for a reassessment of John 
Holt’s ‘Escape from Childhood’, a text which was highly controversial for its time. 
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Freeman has long called for a reassessment of Holt’s work among others such as 
Farson and Cohen (see for example, 1997, 2007). Whilst Holt’s work has attracted 
significant criticism in academic literature alongside the work of other child 
liberationists and child libertarianism more generally, it has not been the focus of 
sustained attention in its own right. Nor has it specifically been considered in the 
context of what we now ‘know’ as the common language of children’s rights discourse 
in the form of the CRC. 
 
This paper uses Holt’s Escape from Childhood as an overarching framework against 
which to examine the current state of play on children’s rights. Whilst significant 
disjuncture over 40 years on is to be expected, the paper suggests that there are more 
overlaps between the work of Holt and children’s rights discourse today than has been 
accorded, and many of the challenges outlined by Holt remain. By way of illustration 
the Convention and the observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child will 
be drawn upon as a means of assessing the extent to which ‘rights talk’ and ‘rights 
action’ has developed and/or contrasts with that proposed by Holt in 1974. The 
substantive work produced by the Committee is invaluable in identifying the key 
elements of rights talk and the trends and challenges of rights praxis. It must be 
acknowledged that, like any document, both Holt’s work and that of the Committee are 
inevitably shaped by the contexts in which they were produced. Nonetheless, they are 
characteristic of two discourses which have arguably been radical for their time in 
different ways; with children’s rights in the form of the CRC achieving world 
endorsement (Freeman 1997). The paper concludes by suggesting that whilst Holt 
has often been critiqued for being too radical, in the context of current discourse it is 
5 
 
not as radical as it might first appear. Rather, if we are to truly view children as rights-
holders, the parameters of children’s rights must continue to be challenged and evolve.  
 
Childhood: Determining the ‘Problem’  
 
It is tempting to dismiss at face value the work of child liberationists like Holt in favour 
of current thinking on children’s rights. The granting of so-called ‘equal rights’ for 
children and adults without distinction can be variously critiqued as prompting the 
‘disappearance of childhood’ (Postman 1982); as legitimating adult rights as the most 
unquestionably ‘optimum set’ of rights for all (Purdy 1994); as negating the suggestion 
that some children and young people may need more protection than others; or in a 
traditional paternalist vein, that children simply do not have the competency to make 
use of equal rights on the same basis as adults, and that, ultimately, ‘we fear children 
and their autonomy’ (McGillivray 1994: 244). As shall be discussed later, that fear has 
been brought to the fore in the types of rights that Holt suggested be accorded to 
children, and the subsequent debate, critique and, to some degree, dismissiveness, 
that has resulted. Holt’s book also falls foul in that it is not an academic text, nor is it 
evidence-based, instead using anecdotal evidence, events and observations of 
children with their families (mainly in airports!) upon which to present arguments. 
However, as Fortin (2005), Freeman (1997, 2007) and Archard (2004) among others 
have indicated, the equal rights proposed by liberationists like Holt have prompted 
important debates and, in so doing, have contributed to the evolving discourse in 
children’s rights, not least with respect to children’s capacity for autonomy. It is time to 
look at some of these arguments and contributions more closely.  
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‘The Problem of Childhood’ is Holt’s opening chapter and establishes the overall 
premise of the text which focuses on the ‘institution of modern childhood, their 
attitudes, customs, and laws that define and locate children in modern life…..’ (p.1). 
Fundamentally, it is about ‘the many ways in which modern childhood seems... to be 
bad for most of those who live within it and how it should and might be changed.’ (Ibid). 
This in itself was quite a radical statement for its time with the old adage ‘childhood 
are the best years of your life’ coming under attack. That it was not children who were 
problematic but the broader institutional structures which mediate and position children 
as ‘of being wholly subservient and dependent, of being seen by older people as a 
mixture of expensive nuisance, salve, and super-pet’ (p.1) is recognition of the social 
forces and norms that can become deeply embedded within our society This is an 
important point which acknowledges the social construction of childhood; an argument 
which is now well developed (see Qvortrup 1994, Mayall,2000; Prout and James 1990) 
yet Holt is rarely referenced in this regard. In questioning what he refers to as the 
‘institution of childhood’ – defined as attitudes, customs and laws that impose a barrier 
between children and adults and locate children as inherently dependent (p.6), Holt 
threw out a challenge to the then status quo. 
 
In a Bourdieudian sense, childhood can be understood as a social microcosm 
constitutive of a set of objective structures and competitive positions in which the 
habitus of childhood operates. The largely invisible relations between individuals and 
groups are contingent upon relations of power and capital (Bourdieu and Wacquant 
1992). Childhood thus becomes a site of struggle and conflict over the application of 
resources in a bid to maintain or enhance existing positions in the social order; in this 
instance the distinction between children and adults. The doxa (and doxic knowledge) 
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of childhood as a particular world view or accepted beliefs and ideas about ways of 
being and doing1 contains ‘an implicit definition of the fundamental view of conformity’ 
(Bourdieu 1977: 161) and implies various ways of ‘reasserting solidarity’ (Ibid). Both 
the natural and social world appear as self-evident and taken for granted. The strength 
of the doxa varies within and between social fields. Generally speaking however, ‘the 
stabler the objective structures and the more fully they reproduce themselves in the 
agents’ dispositions, the greater the extent of the field of doxa, of that which is taken 
for granted’ (Bourdieu 1977: 165/166). ‘Paradoxical submission’ (Bourdieu 2001) to 
the doxa is an effect of symbolic violence, of ‘gentle’ violence which becomes exerted 
through ‘symbolic channels of cognition and communication’ (Ibid: 1/2). Bourdieu 
illustrates the nature of symbolic violence more clearly as: 
 
[C]oercion which is set up only through the consent that the dominated cannot 
fail to give to the dominator (and therefore to the domination) when their 
understanding of the situation and relation can only use the instruments of 
knowledge that they have in common with the dominator, which, being merely 
the incorporated form of the structure of the relation of domination, make this 
relation appear as natural; or, in other words, when the schemes they 
implement in order to perceive and evaluate themselves or to perceive and 
evaluate the dominators (high/low, male/female, white/black [and in the 
context of this paper - child/adult] are the product of the incorporation of the 
(thus naturalized) classifications of which their social being is the product. 
(Bourdieu 2000: 170) 
 
We can begin to see how ways of ‘being’ and ‘doing’ can become taken for granted, 
determined by the so-called ordinary order of things. It is important to note that Holt’s 
book emerged in the context of wider social and civil rights movements of the time with 
respect to gender, race, and disability for example. In a similar way to how 
                                                          
1 Bourdieu conceptualises the doxa and doxic knowledge as taken for granted ideas about the social 
world and which arises due to “the coincidence of the objective structures and the internalized 
structures which provides the illusion of immediate understanding, characteristic of practical 
experience of the familiar universe, and which at the same time excludes from that experience any 
inquiry as to its own conditions of possibility” (Bourdieu 1990: 20). 
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understandings of disability became understood as a key source of oppression for 
disabled people (Oliver 1990; Barnes 1991, 1996), so too did dominant 
understandings and doxic knowledge around childhood become challenged, the 
normative roots and legitimating effects of the sentimentalisation of childhood 
exposed. Holt’s work uncovers some of these deeply held social norms. For example: 
 
Modern childhood is an extraordinary emotional and financial burden…. 
We lock the old and young into this extraordinarily tense and troublesome 
relationship and then tell them that they have to like it, even love it, and 
that if they don’t they are bad or wrong or sick. (p.38) 
 
This is not to say he does so elegantly or that arguments are clearly developed – often 
they are not, but as we progress through the book we become aware of key themes. 
The first half or so of the book focuses on the types of oppression that children can 
experience, most notably by being involuntarily located within a mythical ‘walled 
garden’ of a ‘Happy, Safe, Protected, Innocent Childhood.’ (p.7). Holt’s key point is 
that childhood is indeed far from being unquestionably ‘happy’, ‘safe’ and ‘innocent’ 
for all, a point reinforced in today’s society in the context of emergent data on child 
poverty, abuse and exploitation, trafficking, and child protection referrals more 
generally. Nor does the state escape Holt’s criticisms and he expresses concern at a 
future ‘tyranny of “professional helpers”’ (48) and of the power of ‘expert knowledge’ 
expounded by ‘helpers’. The latter has generated increased criticism more recently as 
can be seen in Mayall’s observation that ‘whole armies of health and social workers 
work to modify childhood’ (2000: 243).  
 
However, Holt seems to assume that we cannot change the institution or walled 
garden of childhood; that the walled garden cannot be restructured and that the only 
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solution is for children to move out of, or essentially be ‘freed’ from that garden, which 
he subsequently refers to as ‘prison’, into an adult world. Whilst the book attempts to 
challenge adult conceptualisations of childhood and what children can and cannot do, 
leaving the institution of childhood largely unchanged risks replacing one type of 
‘prison’ with another and one battle for another. This is reinforced by Holt when he 
refers to the burden and nuisance of children (p.34, 43) and the difficulty of defending 
and justifying the institution of childhood (p.11). While Holt’s proposed solution is for 
children to be treated like adults and to be accorded the same autonomy rights as 
adults (see below), in so doing he despairs rather than empowers childhood. So doing 
denies the value of childhood, and the need to challenge the structures of childhood 
rather than merely recognising them or replacing one institution with another. Equating 
adulthood as ‘freedom’ or the optimum or ‘ultimate’ and problem-free state of being 
negates the ways in which adulthood can in and of itself become another institution. 
 
The Parameters of ‘Children’s Rights’ 
 
The importance of valuing childhood is at the heart of the CRC with the vulnerabilities 
of children when compared to adults a key assumption which runs throughout. This is 
in contradistinction to Holt’s theorem that childhood is and always will be inherently 
bad. The CRC has arguably sought to redefine the parameters of childhood through 
first and foremost recognising all children as rights-holders and secondly by 
recognising the importance of affirming a range of protective rights, participation rights 
and provision rights for children and young people (Hammarberg 1990). In his chapter 
on rights, Holt suggests that when referring to ‘children’s rights’, he is referring to the 
rights that adults have:  
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I urge that the law grant and guarantee to the young the freedom that it now 
grants to adults to make certain kinds of choices, do certain kinds of things, 
and accept certain kinds of responsibilities…. In granting me rights the law 
does not say what I must or shall do. It simply says that it will not allow other 
people to prevent me from doing these things. (95).  
 
The rights that Holt calls for are: the right to vote, to work, to own property, to travel, 
to choose one’s guardian, a guaranteed income, legal and financial responsibility, to 
control one’s own learning, to use drugs, to drive, and the right to enter into 
relationships and to have control over personal sex lives. Many of these are similar to 
those espoused by Farson (1978). 
 
It is useful to examine some of the points made in the above quote in greater depth. 
First, Holt begins by stating that, just as adults have rights, so too should children be 
recognised as rights-holders. This was a significant statement for its time, before the 
CRC came into being, and is to be welcomed on that basis alone. Helping to bring 
children to the rights-table in this era was no easy matter. Yes, this attracted 
controversy and debate, but challenging the status quo necessitates exactly that. This 
is what allows us to define, redefine and refine our own arguments, to think through 
the implications of that which we are arguing academically or otherwise. Holt’s 
argument, along with those of other child liberationists, provided a platform whereby 
such enabling but challenging conversations could take place, even if in a defensive 
manner. Fundamentally, this article is being written over forty years later in an era 
where children are now formally recognised as rights-holders through the CRC. Like 
other human rights treaties, the CRC, in particular through State reports and the 
concluding observations of the Committee has shone a spotlight upon the range of 
exclusionary and oppressive practices that have long been experienced by children 
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generally as well as specific groups of children including disabled children, girl 
children, migrant, asylum-seeking and refugee children and lesbian, bisexual, gay, and 
transgender children (LBGT). Thus we can again see some similarity with Holt’s 
contribution to children’s rights discourse in the recognition that childhood was not and 
is not free from discrimination, disadvantage or exclusion.  
 
The second point made in the above quotation is that children’s rights are, in essence, 
about adult rights. This is perhaps where Holt’s argument begins to run into difficulties 
and diverges from children’s rights discourse as we know it today. To equate children’s 
rights solely with adult rights is to reinforce some of the age-old difficulties of human 
rights discourse more generally. The international human rights framework has 
arguably also perpetuated and legitimated a form of rights behaviour and rights-talk 
that has been synonymous with the notion of a homogenous, white, male, and adult 
subject. Neither the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, nor the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (1966) or the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)(1966) were designed with children 
in mind. The emergence of thematic human rights instruments such as the Convention 
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (1979), the Convention 
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) (1965), the CRC, the Convention 
on Migrant Workers (CMW) (1990) and more recently, the Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) (2006), is indicative of the complexities of 
assuming an homogenous subject in human rights law. Conversations are also 
ongoing on the development of a thematic instrument on the rights of older people 
(Williams 2011a). The textual absence of children in the core treaties prior to the CRC 
has served only to reaffirm their invisibility as rights-holders, despite their oft cited 
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universality. If children’s rights are adult rights, and adult rights are all-encompassing 
and universal in practice, then there would be no need for such a range of human 
rights treaties targeted at different population groups.  
 
In contrast to the CRC, Holt does not appear to acknowledge the differing contextual 
experiences of children, preferring instead to present children (and adults for that 
matter) as a homogenous grouping. When discussing how the espoused rights might 
manifest and be applied to children ‘of all ages’, such as the right to vote, he falls into 
the trap of presenting his arguments most fully with reference to young people rather 
than younger children (see also Archard 2004 on this point p.75), glossing over the 
idiosyncrasies of young children in the process. The need to not only recognise 
children of different ages, and children from different groups as rights-holders, but also 
to consider precisely what any such rights might mean for various groups of children 
can be seen through the Committee’s observations and commentaries, most notably 
with the development of general comments for children in early years (UN, 2006), 
children with disabilities (UN, 2007), indigenous children (UN, 2009a), and currently 
the development of a general comment on the rights of adolescents. For example, in 
its general comment on early childhood, the Committee has noted that young children 
are especially at risk of discrimination because they are relatively powerless and 
depend on others for the realization of their rights (UN 2006, para 11). In the same 
document, the Committee further emphasises the intersectionality of early childhood 
with other characteristics and backgrounds including young girl children, young 
children with disabilities, young children affected by HIV/AIDS, and young children with 
different ethnic origin, class/caste, personal circumstances and lifestyle, or political 
and religious beliefs (Ibid).  
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Holt acknowledges that ‘in granting… rights the law does not say what I must or shall 
do. It simply says that it will not allow other people to prevent me from doing these 
things…’ That is, that rights cannot be taken away and that we can equally choose not 
to exercise our rights. This point has been emphasised by the Committee in its general 
comment on article 12 where it has made clear that ‘The child, however, has the right 
not to exercise this right. Expressing views is a choice for the child, not an obligation’ 
(UN 2009b, at para 16). However, as has also been recognised by the Committee, it 
is important that the child or young person has a genuine choice in whether or not to 
exercise his or her right to, for example, express a view. This is difficult when it comes 
to the types of rights outlined by Holt as discussed below.  
 
Holt’s Rights: Different tools for the right job? 
 
While Holt was an advocate of rights for children, he did not envisage that a ‘society 
should or will pass an omnibus bill tying all these rights into one package. It seems 
likely that if the young gain these rights, they will only do so as a result of a long series 
of laws and court decisions, many of them affecting only one right at a time.’ (p. 97). 
This statement is indicative of the controversy attached to the types of rights 
advocated by Holt and other child liberationists. Underpinning these rights is a belief 
in the self-determination of all children, and that children should be able to choose for 
themselves how to lead their own lives (Archard 2004: 72). For Holt, the right to vote, 
to work, to own property, to travel, to choose one’s guardian, a guaranteed income, 
legal and financial responsibility, to control one’s own learning, to use drugs, to drive, 
and to enter into relationships and control their sex lives are the key areas in which 
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children should be able to make decisions for themselves in the same way as adults. 
Holt does not make reference to any protective (or indeed any other) rights. This has 
been in contrast to what Archard (2004) refers to as the paternalist ‘caretaker thesis’ 
which argues that children should not be able to make decisions for themselves. It 
could be argued that, until recently, children have been caught between the opposing 
sides of the dichotomy of self-determination. On the one hand, that making choices 
about one’s own life is of such importance that it should be granted to children, but on 
the other hand, that making choices about one’s own life is too important to be left to 
children.  
 
In this vein, the CRC has played a crucial role in transcending the dichotomy by 
adopting a holistic approach to children’s rights. While Holt appears to assume that 
children are already protected in some way, his decision not to explicitly engage with 
children’s relative need for particular protections undermines his overall arguments on 
rights of autonomy. It fails to recognise the particularities of children’s experiences and 
the realities of abuse, neglect and exploitation. For example, he suggests that the right 
for a child of any age to work is important for self-respect, ‘alleviating boredom’, 
developing skills and in making children feel valued. On the issue of exploitation of 
children in work, he suggests that this is ‘unlikely’ and that the ability to generate 
income is more important than the impact of missing school. While these ideas appear 
to conflict with current discourse on children’s rights, they are perhaps not as disparate 
as they might first appear. The right of children to be protected from economic 
exploitation is affirmed by Article 32 of the CRC, alongside a requirement for a 
minimum age for admission to employment. However, Holt’s underlying message 
could be interpreted as being broader than simply a right to work, but rather in work 
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as a means of countering poverty and facilitating the development of the child; both 
factors which have been given countenance in the CRC in Articles 6 (the right to life, 
survival and development), 27 (the right to an adequate standard of living), 28 (the 
right to education), and 29 (the aims of education). For example, Article 28(1)(d) 
stipulates that every child has a right to access educational and vocational information 
and guidance while the Committee has emphasised that education is aimed at 
‘ensuring that essential life skills are learnt by every child and that no child leaves 
school without being equipped to face the challenges that he or she can expect to be 
confronted with in life.’ (UN 2001: para 9). Play is also discussed by Holt in the context 
of a right to work. He suggests that, like work, play can also have a serious purpose. 
Further, that: 
 
Children like to do things and make things that free and engage their 
imaginations…. Adults think that if they build something that looks like, say, 
a whale, children will play all kinds of games with it and on it in which they 
imagine themselves doing something with a real whale. Not so…., On 
adventure or construction playgrounds children are constantly building 
things…. What is important is that they are in charge of the work. They are 
building something they want to build and deciding how they will do it.’ 
(p.114/115) 
 
To this end, the Committee has stated: 
 
Play and recreation are essential to the health and well-being of children and 
promote the development of creativity, imagination, self-confidence, self-
efficacy, as well as physical, social, cognitive and emotional strength and 
skills….Through their involvement in play and recreation, children learn by 
doing; they explore and experience the world around them; experiment with 
new ideas, roles and experiences and in so doing, learn to understand and 
construct their social position within the world. (UN 2013a, at para 9) 
 
Children are entitled to exercise choice and autonomy in their play and 
recreational activities, as well as in their participation in cultural and artistic 
activities. (UN 2013a, at para 19) 
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The similarities here are evident. What is less evident is any apparent overlap between 
Holt’s call for children to have the right to control their own learning and the right to 
education established in the CRC. Holt makes clear that he opposes compulsory 
education, refers to schools as ‘dangerous institutions’ (p.165), ‘anti-democratic’, 
‘authoritarian’ and ‘destructive’, and calls for children to have the right to decide what 
they learn and how, where, how much, how fast and with what help, including the right 
to decide whether they want to learn in a school and for how much of the time. He 
expresses concern that the content and scope of education is determined by adults 
and suggests that the requirement that a child go to school, ‘for about 6 hours a day, 
180 days a year, for about 10 years… is such a gross violation of civil liberties that few 
adults would stand for it.’ (p.163). Ironically, the right to primary education is the only 
compulsory right contained within the CRC (Lundy 2006). However we can begin to 
see some merit in Holt’s argument if we consider these concerns in the context of 
Articles 28 and 29 and the Committee’s commentary on education. Much of Holt’s 
concerns can be aligned to concerns with the quality of education and with what 
constitutes an effective education. The CRC would thus appear to address these 
concerns. Article 28 affirms the right to education for all while Article 29 clearly sets 
out the aims of education.2 In its subsequent General Comment, the Committee called 
for education to be child-centred, child-friendly and empowering (UN 2001, para 2); 
and to be provided in a way that ‘respects the inherent dignity of the child and enables 
                                                          
2 The development of the child's personality, talents and mental and physical abilities to their fullest potential;  
(b) The development of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and for the principles enshrined in 
the Charter of the United Nations;  
(c) The development of respect for the child's parents, his or her own cultural identity, language and values, for 
the national values of the country in which the child is living, the country from which he or she may originate, 
and for civilizations different from his or her own;  
(d) The preparation of the child for responsible life in a free society, in the spirit of understanding, peace, 
tolerance, equality of sexes, and friendship among all peoples, ethnic, national and religious groups and persons 
of indigenous origin; 
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the child to express his or her views freely in accordance with article 12 (1) and to 
participate in school life.’  (UN 2001, para 8). Examples of the latter include: the 
creation of school communities and student councils; peer education and peer 
counselling; and the involvement of children in school disciplinary proceedings (Ibid). 
These would appear to align with Holt’s call for children to be involved in their learning 
and to exercise a degree of self-determination. In respect of the quality of education, 
the Committee has emphasised that the curriculum should be of direct relevance to 
the child’s social, cultural, environmental and economic context and that teaching 
methods should be tailored to the different needs of different children (Ibid at para 9).  
 
To dismiss education as a dangerous institution, whilst recognising the socialising 
effects of the education system and its possibilities as a means of social control (Ball 
2013), absolves that institution of responsibility to change. The CRC falls short in 
providing children with full autonomy in respect of their education. To provide full 
autonomy in this way, as Holt would desire, would fail to take into account the likely 
consequences of voluntary schooling in perpetuating disadvantage of a much greater 
kind. Specifically, it fails to recognise the realities presented by the accumulation, 
possession and convertibility of various forms of ‘capital’. Capital is ‘what makes the 
games of society…something other than simple games of chance…’ (Bourdieu 1986: 
241). This is not to say that compulsory education neutralises these effects, but it is a 
critical starting point. Like the institution of childhood, the perils of education system 
are being confronted and challenged by the CRC’s obligations and their elaboration 
by the Committee. Children’s involvement in shaping the content of their education, 
the curriculum, the structure of their school day, and the means by which they are 
assessed, has been given much less attention. Holt’s argument in this regard could 
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be given much more serious consideration. His concern that the content and scope of 
education is determined by adults can unfortunately be repeated in contemporary 
society. Whilst the Committee has argued that the curriculum should be tailored and 
of direct relevance to the child’s contexts, children’s explicit contribution to these 
endeavours has not been given its deserved place. 
 
The right to vote is presented as one of the most important rights that should be 
available to children. Holt suggests that a right to vote should be available for people 
of any age. His rationale for this is that since, like adults, children are affected by the 
decisions made by government, they should therefore have a say in those decisions. 
This has clear overlap with Article 12 in the CRC which has been accorded the status 
of one of the four general principles underpinning the Convention, and which states 
that children have the right to express a view on all matters affecting them. At the heart 
of Holt’s assertion is that the voting age, whether 17 or 18, is essentially an arbitrary 
one rather than competence based. A similar argument is made in the context of 
children’s right to drive. Holt argues this should be determined by the ability to pass a 
test based on skill and knowledge rather than age. Further, that it is ‘grossly unjust to 
discriminate in law against anyone merely because he is a member of a statistical 
group’ (p.181). Conversely, when it comes to acquiring financial and legal 
responsibility, Holt suggests that this has more serious consequences and that a case 
can be made for asking people below a certain age to show that they understand some 
of the responsibilities and obligations that they are undertaking (p.161). These 
inconsistencies suggests that Holt does in fact distinguish between children of different 
ages and their associated competencies despite initial arguments to the contrary.  
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The right of young people to vote has attracted growing media attention in recent 
years. In 2012, 16 and 17 year olds were given the right to vote in the 2014 
independence referendum in Scotland with 16 and 17 year olds now also able to vote 
in Scottish Elections including Scottish Parliamentary and local government elections3. 
Sixteen year olds are also able to vote at varying levels of government in Malta, 
Estonia, Ecuador, Cuba, Austria, Argentina, Brazil and Nicaragua. This is far from the 
abolition of a voting age advocated by Holt, and indicative of the long journey that 
remains before all 16 and 17 year olds across the world are able to vote. In calling for 
the dismissal of a voting age, Holt attempts, like other child liberationists, to 
demonstrate that we should not view children as incompetent and lacking in the ability 
for self-determination. This is an important message about the capacity of children and 
the arbitrariness through which age parameters are set. A child or young person does 
not, by virtue of becoming a certain age, suddenly acquire a greater ability or capacity 
to do something. Despite being oft critiqued, Holt’s arguments in these domains – 
alongside Farson and Cohen for example, have stimulated significant debate around 
children’s competences and capacity for decision-making. These are now well 
recognised in the CRC with the concept of evolving capacities taking central stage in 
contemporary children’s rights discourse. By calling for all children to be able to vote 
however, Holt runs into tricky territory. Most notably when comparing six year olds with 
sixteen year olds. The argument here is overly simplistic and its practicalities not well 
thought through with the suggestion that ‘a six year old who wants to vote ought to be 
able to vote’ followed with ‘it seems unlikely that in fact many six-year olds would want 
to vote’ (101). The assumption here is that simply giving the six year old the ability to 
vote is sufficient irrespective of whether or not they wish to exercise it, understand 
                                                          
3 Scottish Elections (Reduction of Voting Age) Act 2015 
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what this means, or require support in exercising that right. Holt is implying that six 
year olds are essentially different from sixteen year olds, something which flies in the 
face of child liberationist arguments. Further, by virtue of giving all children the same 
rights as adults, even when very young, Holt is undermining the significance of rights 
on the basis that all children will be able to exercise rights in the same way without 
support or nuanced consideration. Once again, this negates the very different 
resources and power that adults may hold when compared to very young children in 
particular, and the potential manipulation, undue pressure and exploitation some 
children may be subject to in the process. Doing so risks devaluing childhood, 
particularly if a right can be used or exercised more effectively by some children but 
not others.  
 
The differential position occupied by children in decision-making processes has been 
outlined by the Committee in its deliberations around Article 12. To be given a right to 
express views is, on its own, insufficient, but encompasses a requirement to support 
children to form a view on all matters affecting them (Lundy and McEvoy 2012).  The 
associated right to information is thus critical since ‘it is the precondition of the child’s 
clarified decisions’ (UN, 2009b, para 25). This does not lead me to dismiss Holt’s 
arguments that children have the right to self-determination in their totality but to 
suggest a more nuanced and meaningful approach be adopted. There is much to be 
done and that can be done to facilitate children’s capacity for self-determination in a 
meaningful way. If we are serious about Article 12, then we must also be committed 
to supporting children of all ages to understand the decision-making processes that 
impact on them, their subjects and contexts. This necessarily requires us to do things 
differently – such as providing information in age-appropriate and accessible formats, 
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being mindful of different needs, and providing the space in which such views can be 
expressed, heard and given due weight (Lundy 2007). And most of all, to being open 
to the rich possibilities and outcomes from children’s participation in decision-making 
processes. Holt’s call for a right to vote for children is a nod to the importance of 
participative democracy – something which is increasingly reflected in contemporary 
societies. In this, there is a long way to go, but a reduction of the minimum voting age 
to 16 across the world is an important first step. If we are to truly value children’s Article 
12 rights, then the right to express views ‘on all matters affecting them’ should not be 
constrained on the grounds that some matters are too important for children to express 
views on (see also Freeman 2000).  
 
The right to choose one’s guardian is also problematic. Here Holt expresses desire for 
children to be able to choose guardians other than their parents; what he refers to as 
‘secondary guardians’. This relationship would be entered into with mutual agreement 
between the child and secondary guardians, either of whom would have the right to 
end the relationship and agreement without reason. The basis is that children should 
not have to be dependent on people they did not choose and may not like, but to move 
towards a ‘chosen dependency’. While certainly thought-provoking, it accords no role 
to parents or primary guardians in this process. This may be of some benefit to children 
in difficult home circumstances but fundamentally it exposes children to a new set of 
risks. It is useful to note that Holt was writing at a time when there was no internet or 
danger of online exploitation. What can be taken from this is the importance of 
children’s involvement in decision making processes about their care, including all 
forms of alternative care, that their views be given due weight in matters of their 
placement, the regulations of care in foster families or homes and their daily lives (UN 
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2009, para 97). The context of the time the book was produced can also be 
ascertained from the relatively unproblematic means by which the right of children to 
use drugs is presented. Again, Holt makes the point that ‘whatever rights the law 
grants adults in the matter of drugs should be granted to the young’ and that ‘people 
ought to be able to use the drugs they want’ (p.169). It is unlikely anyone would 
advocate that children be allowed to use tobacco or alcohol, without any age 
restrictions, lest other forms of drugs. 
 
It is noteworthy that Holt’s final substantive chapter focuses on ‘the law, the young, 
and sex’. Here, he makes the argument that ‘all people, including young people, 
should have the right to control their own private sex lives and acts’ (p.183). In short, 
that if young people are given rights, that these should extend to sex ‘regardless of 
age’. This remains as controversial today as it would have then,  - perhaps more so 
given what we now know about the risk and scale of child sex abuse and sexual 
exploitation (see for example, Berelowitz et al, 2012, 2015; NSPCC 2014). Holt’s 
venture into this territory and his subsequent discussion is somewhat naïve and is not 
well argued. He does appear to acknowledge the tensions innate here, and suggests 
that where children remain at home with their parents that their parents would then 
have some say over what their child does or does not do there. He further suggests 
that if children do not want to live by their parents’ rules, that they would have the 
choice of seeking out other guardians or living an independent life. However Holt once 
again does not distinguish between younger children or older children and 
adolescents, or the relative power of adults compared to children and young people. 
This again renders his argument problematic, not least in negating the risks of child 
sex exploitation and abuse, and the very subtle ways in which this can manifest, 
23 
 
including for young people in vulnerable groups (Berelowitz et al, 2012; CEOP 2011; 
Craven et al 2006). Holt does make a critical point here which is unfortunately drowned 
out by the overall tone of the chapter – the importance of educating young people 
about sex and contraception. This has also been emphasised by the Committee, 
notably in general comment 4 where they call on States parties to ‘provide adolescents 
with access to sexual and reproductive information, including on family planning and 
contraceptives, the dangers of early pregnancy, the prevention of HIV/AIDS and the 
prevention and treatment of sexually transmitted diseases’ (UN 2003a, at para 28). 
Debates surrounding children and young people’s rights to enter relationships are 
important, and discussions about their right to sexual and reproductive information is 
critical, however to grant children the same rights as adults in respect of their sexual 
lives risks rights tools becoming exploitative and dangerous rather than empowering 
or protective, particularly when we consider the associated relations of power and 
accumulation of capital by adults in comparison. The overall argument that children 
should be granted the same rights as adults irrespective of age remains contradictory, 
especially where Holt himself appears to subtly distinguish between different ages of 
children and young people when elaborating upon various rights. 
 
Towards Implementation and Beyond 
 
Holt’s vision of children’s rights is challenging. The ways in which these rights might 
be implemented in practice is not given sustained attention. Rights rhetoric is important 
but without thought to its implementation and practicalities it can become a 
meaningless vacuum.  While Holt is not, and does not claim to be, a legal scholar, we 
can see some passing reference to key underpinning principles of rights and their 
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implementation. Notably, in a nod throughout the text to the indivisibility and 
interdependence of rights, Holt asserts that some rights are necessarily tied to others. 
He provides the example of the right to travel and choose one’s home being 
inextricably linked to the right to legal and financial responsibility, to work, and to 
receive an income (p.2). These principles, along with the universality of rights, have 
been recognised as fundamental to human rights (Vienna Declaration 1993. See also 
Donnelly, 2003; Quane 2012) (although the extent to which rights can be understood 
as truly indivisible and interdependent has been disputed by Freeman 2002); a refute 
to suggestions of a hierarchy of rights (Quane 2012). This has further been reaffirmed 
by the Committee in its general comment on measures of implementation (2003b, 
paras 6, 17, 18).  
 
The challenges of implementation are alluded to by Holt when he states: ‘....even if we 
win for the young the right to work, the hard problem will be to see that this right does 
not become a dead letter, a right in name only’ (p.96). These challenges remain in 
contemporary society as can be commonly and consistently seen throughout the 
Committee’s concluding observations to States parties (see also Williams 2011b; 
Lundy, Kilkelly and Byrne 2013). This difficulty emerges because while States parties 
take on obligations to ensure realization of rights in the national fora, the precise nature 
of the action to be taken is not clearly defined. The result of this labyrinth of 
implementation is that while the end goal in rights terms may remain broadly static, 
different states may adopt different approaches to fulfilling their treaty obligations. 
More than forty years on from Holt’s text, we still, almost – if not entirely – universally 
struggle with ensuring that children’s rights are effectively implemented. Perhaps one 
key area of learning in this interim period is that children’s rights are much more 
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nuanced than they might first appear; certainly more so than can be gauged from Holt’s 
writings in the area. This brings with it its own complexities – for adults rather than 
children. On the other hand, it is also indicative of the increased endeavours in seeking 
to understand children’s lived experiences. However we remain on a journey to a 
situation where children’s status as rights-holders is firmly entrenched. Despite the oft 
cited universality of rights, rights ultimately remain gifted from adults. It is adults who 
designed the CRC, decided which rights should be legitimised for children, and who, 
as international advocates for children, have elaborated upon the meaning of the rights 
thererin. Adults remain the gatekeepers to rights, most notably those who hold 
positions as state actors. And it is adults who by and large monitor the extent to which 
children’s rights are being effectively realised at both national and international levels. 
As Freeman (2000) has noted it would be interesting to see what the CRC would look 
like if children had direct input into its development as well as its monitoring and 
implementation. Could there not, for example, be a children’s advisory group to 
complement the work of the UN Committee? The Committee on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities made up of disabled people is a case in point. Freeman also makes 
the critical observation that the CRC as it currently stands should not be understood 
as the end product, but that ‘there are new rights to be debated, new features of 
existing rights to be tested and examined, and new child groups to be emphasised.’ 
(2000: 282). There is a risk that, in celebrating more than 25 years of the CRC’s 
adoption, these rights norms and legitimised rights behaviours become taken for 
granted and beyond reproach, rather than recognised as an ever evolving living 
document. In revisiting Holt’s work and the rights he proposes, we must also ask if the 
rights that currently hold court are sufficient and appropriate for the children of the 
twenty first century. Analysis of such is beyond the confines of this article suffice to 
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say that children’s rights must reflect the challenges of contemporary society such as 
the world of online media, the impacts of austerity cuts, mental ill-health and sexual 
exploitation, as well as the particular experiences of hitherto marginalised groups of 
children including lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender children, and refugee 
children. Further, that children should play a direct role in the identification and 
elaboration of any new rights. Holt’s work reminds us that taking children seriously 
requires us to avoid a place of comfort and complacency.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Children’s rights discourse has evolved significantly in recent decades and reference 
to rights at national level has become commonplace in many jurisdictions. This is in 
stark contrast to the paternalist vein in which children were held at the time in which 
Escape from Childhood was written. The work of children’s liberationists such as Holt 
has been open to criticism for its forthright assumptions that children are the same as 
adults, have the same capacities and should therefore be granted precisely the same 
rights as adults. This, in effect, was perceived as the optimum solution to the 
oppression that children can experience in childhood. In contrast, contemporary 
children’s rights discourse asserts that children, like adults, are rights-holders but are 
more vulnerable than adults because of their age, and require particular protections 
and provisions. Further, that children’s capacities are ever evolving, and may 
necessitate support and guidance in that process. It is these typified rights, as 
established in the CRC, which are perceived as the optimum solution to the 
marginalisation, discrimination, and oppression that children can experience in 
contemporary society. In essence, Holt’s vision of children’s rights and the CRC can 
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be understood as constituting different tools for the right job – as a bid to enhance 
children’s experiences, outcomes and the esteem in which they are held by and in 
society. As different tools for the same job, neither approach can be understood as 
perfect; Holt, in his discussion of the rights he advocates, underestimates the 
complexity of childhood and the need for – at times – differential inputs to achieve 
similar outcomes. That children and adults do come to the ‘game’ with unequal 
resources, skills and capital is not given recognition by Holt. Rather, his observations 
come to represent a failed understanding that the ‘game’ has already begun (Young 
1990), and that the ‘rules’ and ‘standards’ have been constructed by and for adults. If 
children are to take part in this ‘game’, they must conform to those ‘terms and 
conditions’ which have been legitimised.  
 
The CRC goes some way to mediating these terms and conditions for children. 
However we should not be complacent. Over forty years on from Escape from 
Childhood, many challenges remain and implementation of the legitimised rights is an 
ongoing battle. The CRC is indicative of a more measured approach to children’s rights 
but it is not as far removed from Holt’s visions as we might expect. Increasing attention 
has been paid to children’s competences as the detailed commentary on Article 12 
demonstrates (UN, 2009b). It is noteworthy that the latter was developed prior to the 
general comment on the best interests of the child (UN, 2013b). This focus on Article 
12 would have been unthinkable not so long ago. In this vein we can see some overlap 
with liberationist ideals. Other underlying themes in Holt’s text are evident in children’s 
rights discourse today; debates around the reduction in the voting age and the 
importance of children becoming more involved in their own learning are two such 
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examples. Deconstruction of Holt’s assertions in this manner enables similar areas of 
discontent and concerns to be revealed within CRC commentary.  
 
Children’s rights discourse today is, as a whole, much more cautious than Holt’s 1974 
vision. This gradual approach has paid some dividends in socialising states to ‘rights 
behaviour’ via a medium of persuasion and acculturation (Goodman and Jinks 2004). 
By the same token we should be wary of being overly cautious. This can become 
reminiscent of a reconstituted ‘fear’ of children and what might happen if we accord 
them ‘too many rights’.  This is not to suggest that we should go down the liberationist 
route, but that open and enabling conversations need to take place about whether the 
rights currently accorded to children via the CRC are the most appropriate and/or are 
reflective of the needs of all children and their realities. What Holt’s work ultimately 
does, and what it should be acknowledged for, is its fundamental quest for a rethinking 
of children’s position in society – a call to action. What it also does is remind us of the 
power of rights discourse as a tool for change. We would do well to revisit and progress 
the hitherto legitimised rights base to address contemporary gaps and challenges so 
that children can fully enjoy rather than feel the need to escape from childhood.  
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